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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Ratzlaf v. United States:
TO ESTABLISH
THAT A DEFENDANT
"WILLFULLY
VIOLATED" THE
ANTISTR UCTURING
LAW,
31 U.S.C. § 5322(A)
AND § 5324(3) (1993),
THE GOVERNMENT
MUST PROVE THAT
THE DEFENDANT
A CTED WITH
KNOWLEDGE THAT
HIS OR HER
CONDUCT
WAS UNLAWFUL.

It was held in Ratzlafv. United
States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994), that
the government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge of
the illegality of his conduct, when
engaged in the structuring of a
currency transaction for the purposes of evading the reporting requirement of domestic banks as
prohibited by 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a)
and 5324(3)(1993). In so holding,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, found that the
antistructuring statute, § 5324(3),
required (1) knowledge of a domestic bank's obligation to file a
written report with the Secretary of
the Treasury for any cash transaction exceeding $10,000.00; (2)
"structuring" a transaction, i.e.
the dividing of a single transaction
which exceeds the $10,000.00 reporting threshold into two or more
separate transactions, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirement; and that § 5322(a),
which establishes criminal penalties, required (3) actual knowledge
that said structuring is illegal. Id.
at 656.
On October 20, 1988, the defendant, Waldemar Ratzlaf, incurred a $160,000.00 gambling
debt while playing blackjack at the
High Sierra Casino in Reno, Nevada. On October 27, 1988,
Ratzlaf returned to the casino with
$100,000.00 cash in a shopping
bag in order to pay off his debt. He
informed casino personnel that he
did not want any written reports
made reflecting his payment. The
casino vice president then told
Ratzlaf of his statutory requirement to report to state and federal
authorities any cash transaction
exceeding $10,000.00, but that a
cashier's check for the entire
amount could be accepted without
triggering the statute. The casino
furnished Ratzlaf with a limousine

to take him to the bank in order to
obtain a cashier's check. Bank
officials, however, informed
Ratzlaf that domestic banks were
under a similar obligation to report
any cash transactions exceeding
$10,000.00 to state and federal
authorities. As a result, Ratzlaf
proceeded to purchase cashier's
checks in denominations less than
$10,000.00 at different banks in
and around Stateline, Nevada, and
South Lake Tahoe, California.
Ratzlaf returned to the casino and
paid off $76,000.00 of his debt
and paid the balance off a few
weeks later with additional
cashier's checks in denominations
of less than $10,000.00.
At trial, ajury convicted Ratzlaf
of having knowledge of a bank's
reporting obligation and of structuring currency transactions for
the purpose of circumventing the
reporting obligation of financial
institutions in violation of31 U.S.C.
§§ 5322(a) and 5324(3)(1993).
Ratzlaf was fined and sentenced to
prison. On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court affirmed the trial
judge's instructions to the jury,
which stated that the government
need only prove the defendant's
knowledge of the bank's duty to
report cash transactions in excess
of $10,000.00 and that the defendant attempted to evade the reporting requirement. The court of appeals ruled that the government did
not have to establish that the defendant knew that the structuring in
which he was engaged was unlawful in order to give effect to the
"willfulness" requirement in §
5322(a). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict surrounding the meaning ofthe "willfulness" requirement in § 5322(a).
The Court began its analysis by
examining the congressional pur-
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pose for enacting the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act (Bank Secrecy Act) in 1970.

Id. at 658 (citations

omitted).

Noting that the statute contained a
variety of reporting requirements
applicable to foreign and domestic
financial institutions, the Court
found that Congress passed the
Bank Secrecy Act in response to
increasing criminal activity, such
as money laundering and tax evasion, and the use of financial institutions as a means to further such
criminal activity. Id. The Court
continued by stating that Congress
adopted an antistructuring provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, as part of
the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986, in order to prevent
circumvention ofreporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id.
Section 5324 states in pertinent
part: "No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting

requirements of section 5313(a)
with respect to such transaction(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction
with one or more domestic financial institutions."
Id. Section 5322(a) provides for
criminal penalties in the form of a
fine, notto exceed $250,000.00, or
imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both, to be imposed
upon "[a] person willfully violating" the antistructuring statute. Id.
at 658-659.
The Court next interpreted the
meaning of the "willfulness" requirement found in § 5322(a). The
Court rejected the trial court's conclusion that the "willfulness" requirement of § 5322(a) was satisfied by a finding that the defendant
structured cash transactions with
the knowledge of and a purpose to
evade the bank's reporting obliga-

tion. Id. at 659. The Court stated
that "[t]he trial judge in Ratzlaf's
case, with the Ninth Circuit's approbation, treated § 5322(a)'s
"willfulness" requirement essentially as surplusage-as words of
no consequence." Id.
The Court noted that to ascertain the correct meaning of "willful," it must be understood within
its statutory context. The Court
stated that the court of appeals
previously interpreted the "willfulness" requirement as mandating both "knowledge ofthe reporting requirement and a specific intent to commit the crime, i.e., a
purpose to disobey the law." Id.
(citations omitted). The Court
concluded that to apply a different
meaning for each code section to a
term which appears throughout a
statutory text "would open
Pandora's jar." Id. at 660 (quoting United States v. Aversa, 948
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F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993)(en
banc)).
The Court further rejected the
government's contention that the
"willfulness" requirement of §
5322(a) was satisfied by the demonstration that the defendant performed the prohibited conduct of §
5324. 1d. The government argued
that specific intent to do wrong can
be inferred from the commission of
the prohibited activity due to its
illicit purpose as stated in the statute. The government concluded
that an individual structures currency transactions for the unlawful
purpose of evading the statutory
reporting obligations. In response,
the Court stated that "currency
structuring is not inevitably nefarious[,]" and therefore, an additional
showing of "willfulness" to engage in the prohibited activity for
the illicit purpose is necessary. Id.
at 661. Moreover, the Court noted
examples of innocent circumstances
in which an individual would violate the reporting statute under the
government's definition, such as
when a small business entrepreneur makes cash deposits twice a
week in the amounts of $9,500.00,
rather than once a week in the
amount of $19,000.00, which
would triggerthe reporting statute.
Id. According to the Court, the

activity of such an individual was
not the evil intended to be prevented by the statute. The small
businessperson may have made
small cash deposits for the sole
purpose of minimizing the risk of
burglary, or for some other benign
purpose. Id. As a result, the Court
found that the "willfulness" requirement imposed upon the government the burden of showing that
the defendant acted with knowledge ofhis unlawful conduct. Id. at
662. The Court declined to consider the legislative history of the
statute, since it found the statutory
language to be unambiguous. Id. at
662-663.
The Court concluded by stating
that it upheld the principle that
ignorance of the law is no defense
to a criminal charge, unless otherwise legislated by Congress. Id. at
663. The Court found that Congress legislated to that effect in 31
U.S.C. § 5322(a). As a result,
Ratzlaf's conviction was overturned, because the jury was not
instructed to determine whether or
not Ratzlaf knew that the structuring in which he was engaged was
illegal. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, with whom the
Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Thomasjoined, rejected

the majority's construction of §§
5322(a) and 5324(3). Rejecting
the majority's interpretation of
"willful," Justice Blackmun stated
that in a criminal law context,
"willfully" is generally understood
to refer to "'consciousness of the
act but not to consciousness that
the act is unlawful."' Id. at 664
(quoting Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192,209 (1991)). Justice
Blackmun, therefore, concluded
that in order for a willful violation
of§ 5324 to occur, the government
must only prove the defendant's
knowledge of the financial
institution's reporting obligation
and that the defendant structured
currency transactions for the purpose of avoiding those requirements. Id.at 665. Justice Blackmun
found no basis in § 5324 to impose
an "artificially heightened scienter
requirement" and that the
majority's imposition of one "as a
practical matter largely nullifies
the effect of that provision." Id. at
665, 669.
The Ratzlaf decision is significant in that the Supreme Court
resolved the confusion surrounding the statutory interpretation of
the "willfulness" requirement in
the Bank Secrecy Act. The Court
required the government to independently establish the defendant's
knowledge of his criminal actions
as separate and distinct from the
criminal act itself. The Court
breathed new life into the criminal
defense of ignorance ofthe law. By
giving effect to the words "willfully violating" in § 5322(a), the
Court insured that only those defendants who had the specific intent to circumvent the reporting
duty of financial institutions and
who acted with the knowledge that
structuring currency transactions
was unlawful will be convicted.
- Amy Conrad
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